Readings in Formal Epistemology [electronic resource] : Sourcebook / edited by Horacio Arló-Costa, Vincent F. Hendricks, Johan van Benthem.
Contributor(s): Arló-Costa, Horacio [editor.] | Hendricks, Vincent F [editor.] | Van Benthem, Johan [editor.].
Material type: BookSeries: Copyright date: Cham : : Springer International Publishing : : Imprint: Springer,, 2016Publisher: 2016Description: 1 recurso en línea (XXIII, 937 p. 135 illus.) : online resource.Content type: texto Media type: computador Carrier type: recurso en líneaISBN: 9783319204512; 3319204513; 9783319204505; 3319204505.Subject(s): Filosofía | Teoría del conocimiento | Lógica matemática y simbólica | Teoría de juegosDDC classification: 100 Online resources: <img src="/screens/gifs/go4.gif" alt="Go button" border="0" width="21" height="21" hspace="7" align=middle"> Vea este libro electrónicoItem type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice.
Introduction -- 1. Agency and interaction: what we are and what we do in formal epistemology; Jeffrey Helzner and Vincent F. Hendricks -- Part 1. Bayesian Epistemology: Introduction -- 2. Truth and probability; Frank P. Ramsey -- 3. Probable knowledge; Richard C. Jeffrey -- 4. Fine -- grained opinion, probability and the logic of full belief; Bas C. van Fraassen -- 5. A theory of higher order probabilities; Haim Gaifman -- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi -- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi -- 7. Why I am not a Bayesian; Clark Glymour -- 8. A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments? Brian Skyrms -- 9. Some problems for conditionalization and reflection; Frank Arntzenius -- 10. Stopping to reflect; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane -- Part II. Belief Change: Introduction -- 11. On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions; Carlos Alchourrón, Peter G©Þrdenfors and David Makinson -- 12. Theory contraction and base contraction unified; Sven Ove Hansson -- 13. How infallible but corrigible full belief is possible; Isaac Levi -- 14. Belief contraction in the context of the General Theory of Rational Choice; Hans Rott -- 15. A survey of ranking theory; Wolfgang Spohn -- Part III. Decision Theory: Introduction -- 16. Allais's Paradox; Leonard Savage -- 17. Decision theory without 'independence' or without 'ordering'; Teddy Seidenfeld -- 18. Ambiguity and the Bayesian paradigm; Itzhak Gilboa and Massimo Marinacci -- 19. State dependent utilities; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane -- 20. Causal decision theory; James M. Joyce and Allan Gibbard -- 21. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann -- Part IV. Logics of Knowledge and Belief: Introduction -- 22. Epistemology without knowledge and without belief; Jaakko Hintikka -- 23. Epistemic operators; Fred Dretske -- 24. Elusive knowledge; David Lewis -- 25. Knowledge and skepticism; Robert Nozick -- 26. On logics of knowledge and belief; Robert Stalnaker -- 27. Sentences, belief and logical omniscience, or what does deduction tell us? Rohit Parikh -- 28. The logic of justification; Sergei Artemov -- 29. Learning theory and epistemology; Kevin T. Kelly -- 30. Some computational constraints in epistemic logic; Timothy Williamson -- Part V. Interactive Epistemology: Introduction -- 31. Convention (an excerpt); David Lewis -- 32. Three views of common understanding; Jon Barwise -- 33. The logic of public announcements, common knowledge and private suspicions; Alexandru Baltag, Lawrence S. Moss and S¿ awomir Solecki -- 34. A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision; Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets -- 35. Agreeing to disagree; Robert J. Aumann -- 36. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium; Robert J. Aumann and Adam Brandenburger -- 37. Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games; Robert Stalnaker -- 38. Substantive rationality and backward induction; Joseph Y. Halpern.
'Epistemología formal' es un término acuado a fines de la década de 1990 para una nueva constelación de intereses en filosofía, cuyos orígenes se encuentran en trabajos anteriores de epistemólogos, filósofos de la ciencia y lógicos. Aborda una creciente agenda de problemas relacionados con el conocimiento, la creencia, la certeza, la racionalidad, la deliberación, la decisión, la estrategia, la acción y la interacción del agente, y lo hace utilizando métodos de lógica, probabilidad, computabilidad, decisión y teoría de juegos. El volumen también incluye un índice completo y sugerencias para lecturas adicionales, y por lo tanto ofrece un paquete completo de enseñanza e investigación para estudiantes y académicos de investigación de epistemología formal, filosofía, lógica, ciencias de la computación, economía teórica y psicología cognitiva.